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The Proliferation of Employment Discrimination
Statutory Protections: An Overview
An attorney who is bringing an employment discrimination suit
for the first time faces a jumble of prohibitions, exemptions, and
time limitations. The number of statutory remedies available to the
person who has been discriminated against in employment has expanded greatly in the last twelve years. The Civil Rights Act of
1964,' section 1981,2 the National Labor Relations Act, 3 the Equal
Pay Act,4 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,' prohibit
forms of discrimination for which there were no statutory remedies
as recently as the early 1960's.This article will examine the coverage, prohibitions, procedures, and remedies of the major employment discrimination statutes.
TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS

ACT

OF

1964

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) is the primary
statute in the field of employment discrimination. It was intended
to serve as a vehicle to remedy employment discrimination based
on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.' The statute also
created the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC),
which processes charges of Title VII violations.8 Congress amended
the Act in 1972,1 effecting a number of significant changes in the
coverage and enforcement of the statute.'" The amendments ex1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to e-15,(1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (Supp. IV
1974).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970).
3. 29 U.S.C. 99 141-187 (1970 & Supp. IV 1974).
4. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1970).
5. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1970 & Supp. IV 1974).
6. 42 U.S.C. 99 2000e to e-15 (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (Supp. IV
1974).
7. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(a) (Supp. IV 1974).
9. 42 U.S.C. 99 2000e to e-17 (Supp. IV 1974), amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-15 (1970).
10. The amendments reduced the number of employees necessary for coverage from 25 to
15, extended coverage to all state and local governments, added a new section extending
coverage to federal government employees with enforcement relegated to the Civil Service
Commission, eliminated the exemption for educational institutions, broadened the exemption for religious organizations, and, finally, granted the EEOC the power to sue, and lengthened the period for filing a charge from 90 to 180 days. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (Supp. IV
1974). The definition of the religious exemption was broadened from "religious activities" to
"all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j)
(Supp. IV 1974), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970). It seems that Congress intended only
to preserve the statutory right of sectarian schools to discriminate on religious grounds in
hiring, but it is apparent that the new definition goes further. See King's Garden, Inc. v. FCC,
498 F.2d 51, 54 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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panded the scope of the Act and, by granting the EEOC enforcement powers, added a new potential plaintiff to each Title VII suit.
Coverage and Exemptions
Title VII applies to any "industry affecting commerce,"" where
fifteen or more persons are employed. 12 Employers covered by the
Act include individuals, corporations, unions, partnerships, trusts,
and governments.' 3 The Act also regulates the practices of employment agencies and labor organizations. 4
ProhibitedActs and Defenses
Title VII prohibits discrimination in hiring, discharge, compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment where such discrimination is based on the individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.' 5 An employer may not limit, segregate, or classify
employees in ways that deprive them of employment opportunities." Restrictions are placed on employment notices and advertising,17 and the use of ability tests is illegal where the "test, its adminthe results is . . .designed, intended or
istration or action upon
8
discriminate.'
to
used
The defenses Title VII makes available to the employer are business necessity, a bona fide seniority or merit system, ability testing,
and bona fide occupational qualifications. The first, the business
necessity defense, is derived from a provision stating that an individual shall have no recourse under the Act if a court finds that
the alleged discrimination occurred "for any reason other than discrimination on account of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. . . ."' This defense has seldom succeeded. Arguments of economic necessity (administrative costs of wage garnishments) or security (discrimination based on existence of arrest record) have not
persuaded the courts."
11. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(h) (Supp. IV 1974).
12. Id. at § 2000e(b).
13. Id. at § 2000e(a).
14. Id. at §§ 2000e(c), (d).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1970). In Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., Inc., 414 U.S. 86
(1973), the Supreme Court held that it is not illegal to discriminate on the basis of citizenship
or alienage.
16. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1974). Title VII does not prohibit all forms of
discrimination. For example, an employee would have no protection under the Act against
some types of discrimination, including political association or private morality.
17. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(b) (Supp. IV 1974).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. IV 1974).
20. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Green v. Missouri Pac. R.R.
Co., 523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1975) (business necessity does not justify making absence of arrest
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Title VII allows an employer to discriminate pursuant to a "bona
fide seniority or merit system . . ." or pursuant to a system that
measures earnings by quantity or quality of production.2 ' The courts
have had some difficulty interpreting this provision as the Act does
not define "bona fide ' ' 2 and the legislative history is of little assistance.2 3 An employer is also protected if he acts upon the results of
a professionally developed ability test that is not designed or used
to discriminate.2 4 Since the United States Supreme Court decision
in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,25 holding that such tests must be
this defense is rarely successful in purely
demonstrably job-related,
26
Title VII attacks.
Additionally, Title VII excepts discriminatory employment practices based on bona fide occupational qualifications (bfoq) .27The
bfoq must be "reasonably necessary to the normal operation" of the
enterprise, and the exception applies only to discrimination based
on religion, sex, or national origin. 28 There is no exception for race
or color. The courts have construed this provision narrowly. For
example, customer preference was insufficient to justify an airline
requirement that all cabin attendants be female.29 Weight lifting
requirements used to exclude females are permissible only if it can
all" females would be
be demonstrated that "all or substantially
30
unable to lift the specified weight.
record a condition precedent to employment); Wallace v. Debron Corp., 494 F.2d 674 (8th
Cir. 1974) (cost of processing garnishment orders does not constitute business necessity). In
Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 799 n.8 (4th Cir. 1971), the court commented:
"While considerations of economy and efficiency will often be relevant to determining the
existence of business necessity, dollar cost alone is not determinative."
21. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970). See Note, The Continuing Validity of Seniority Systems Under Title I: Sharing the Burden of Discrimination,8 Loy. CHI. L.J. 882 (1977).
22. See, e.g., Watkins v. United Steel Workers, Local No. 2369, 516 F.2d 41 (5th Cir.
1975).
23. See generally Gould, Employment Security, Seniority and Race: The Role of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 13 How. L.J. 1 (1967); Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7
B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 431 (1966).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970).
25. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
26. See, e.g., Chance v. Board of Examiners, 458 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1972). But see Smith
v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 397 F. Supp. 580 (N.D. Ala. 1975); James v. Stockham
Valves & Fittings Co., 394 F. Supp. 434 (N.D. Ala. 1975). See generally Reiter, Compensating
for Race or National Origin in Employment Testing, 8 Loy. Cm. L.J. 687 (1977).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1970).
28. Id.
29. Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
950 (1971).
30. Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969); Bowe v. ColgatePalmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969).
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Procedures and Time Limitations

Title VII procedures are complex and vary depending upon
whether the state where the alleged violation occurred has a fair
employment practices commission.3 ' The individual has 180 days
from the time of the allegedly discriminatory act to file a charge
with the appropriate state agency (or with the EEOC if there is no
state fair employment practices commission).32 Since some violations are continuing in nature rather than single occurrences, the
time limitation does not begin to run until the violations termi33
nate.
The state agency is given exclusive jurisdiction for sixty days to
investigate and, if it finds reasonable cause to believe that a violation has occurred, to attempt to conciliate. 3 Following this sixty day
period the individual must file a complaint within thirty days of the
time the state terminates its proceedings. Regardless of the disposition of the state proceedings, the complainant must file with the
35
EEOC within 300 days of the discriminatory incident.
The EEOC then conducts its own investigation. If it finds that a
violation may have occurred, it is required to use the "informal
methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion" to remedy the
violation. 31 Realistically, however, the EEOC does not have the time
or necessary work force to attempt conciliation or even to conduct
31. When Title VII was enacted in 1964, only 25 states had fair employment practice laws.
At the present time, 42 states have such statutes. 8 FAni EMPL. PRAc. MAN. (BNA) § 451:2223. The state laws vary in coverage, enforcement, and sanctions, some making violation a
misdemeanor while others rely on voluntary compliance. Id. at § 451:1. Most prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of race, religion, and national origin, and some include sex
and/or age. The state laws generally rely upon education and conciliation, and hence there
has been minimal litigation in the state courts. Id. at 451:3.
32. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (Supp. IV 1974). Even though a state agency exists, a wise
precaution for the aggrieved individual or his attorney would be to file with the EEOC at the
same time that he files with the state agency. This procedure would provide assurance that
the initial filing periods are met. See Vigil v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 455 F.2d 1222 (10th
Cir. 1972). The EEOC then must wait for the state's 60-day exclusive jurisdiction to elapse
before beginning its own investigation. Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522 (1972).
33. As a general guideline, employees who are alleging discrimination by their present
employers are alleging a continuing violation so that the limitation period is not tolled while
the violation continues. Bartmess v. Drewrys U.S.A., Inc., 444 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1971). The 180-day limitation period begins for former employees on
the date of their departure. Terry v. Bridgeport Brass Co., 519 F.2d 806 (7th Cir. 1975). This
limitation has been extended by some courts for equitable reasons where the plaintiff can
show he was not aware until after his discharge of the discriminatory nature of the action.
Reeb v. Economic Opp. Atlanta, Inc., 516 F.2d 924 (5th Cir. 1975).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (Supp. IV 1974).
35. Id. at § 2000e-5(c), (e).
36. Id. at § 2000e-5(b). The absence of an EEOC finding of "reasonable cause" is not,
however, a bar to private suit. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798 (1973).
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thorough investigations in all cases. If the EEOC does not carry out
its statutory mandate to attempt conciliation, the private plaintiff
is not barred from filing suit. 37 But conciliation attempts are a con38
dition precedent to the EEOC's bringing suit.
If no conciliation agreement has been reached within thirty days
from the time the charge was filed with the EEOC, the Commission
may file a complaint in federal district court. 9 The EEOC may lose
its right to sue if it does not file suit within 180 days of receiving
the charge.40 Where there has been no conciliation agreement and
the EEOC has not gone to court within 180 days of the filing date,
the aggrieved individual may request a notice of right to sue. 4 This
"right to sue letter" evidencing the lapse of the EEOC's period of
exclusive jurisdiction is almost always a prerequisite to private
suit.4" While an individual is entitled to the right to sue letter after
the 180-day period has ended, he is also free to wait until the EEOC
37. See Russell v. American Tobacco Co., 528 F.2d 357 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 935 (1976); Tuft v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 517 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1052 (1976); Dent v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 406 F.2d 399 (5th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 403 U.S. 912 (1971).
38. United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., Inc., 517 F.2d 826 (5th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976) (dictum); EEOC v. Container Corp. of Am., 352 F. Supp. 262
(M.D. Fla. 1972).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. IV 1974).
40. Until fairly recently a conflict existed within the courts of appeals as to whether the
EEOC's right to bring suit was limited by the 180-day exclusive jurisdiction provision of the
Act. The remedial purposes of the Act, together with the EEOC's heavy work load and limited
work force would indicate that the Commission should not be held to such a strict limitation.
Laches and the employer's legitimate interest in having the controversy settled are contrary
considerations. The courts now seem to agree that the EEOC may file suit at any time. See,
e.g., EEOC v. Duval Corp., 528 F.2d 945 (10th Cir. 1976); EEOC v. Kimberly Clark Corp.,
511 F.2d 1352 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 994 (1975); EEOC v. E.I. duPont de Nemours
& Co., 516 F.2d 1297 (3d Cir. 1975); EEOC v. Cleveland Mills Co., 502 F.2d 153 (4th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 946 (1975) (suit allowed four and a half years after filing of
charge); EEOC v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 505 F.2d 610 (5th Cir. 1974).
However, where an individual has filed suit, the Commission may then be limited to its
right of permissive intervention. EEOC v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 493 F.2d 71 (8th Cir. 1974).
In some situations the EEOC could still file a separate suit based on distinct allegations.
EEOC v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 535 F.2d 533 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 638 (1976)
(married woman challenges pregnancy-benefit provisions; EEOC allowed to bring suit
against same defendant concerning discriminatory policies affecting men and unmarried
women); EEOC v. Huttig Sash & Door Co., 511 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1975) (private suit challenging segregated facilities dismissed; EEOC allowed to maintain suit concerning discriminatory
job classifications).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. IV 1974).
42. Stebbins v. Continental Ins. Cos., 442 F.2d 843, 845-46 (D.C. Cir. 1971). However, the
court indicated that the requirement may be excused if the individual persuasively claims
that it is a hardship for him to obtain the letter or that the EEOC refuses to give it to him.
Upon receipt of the letter, the individual has 90 days to file a complaint in federal court. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. IV 1974).
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has completed its investigation and conciliation attempts.4 3
The relationship between Title VII and grievance procedures was
recently clarified by the Supreme Court in IBEW, Local 790 v.
Robbins & Myers, Inc." The Court held that resort to grievance
procedures does not toll the running of the EEOC limitation period.45 Not settled is whether the period may be extended for equitable reasons or whether it is an inflexible jurisdictional prerequisite."
Class actions under Title VII permit a large group of plaintiffs to
obtain relief in a single suit. Most courts have taken a flexible approach to the requirements of rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.47 Some employ the presumption that race or sex discrimination is class discrimination by definition.4 8 Since all class members need not have filed a complaint with the EEOC,49 persons
otherwise time-barred from bringing individual actions can be afforded relief. The rule's notice requirement-an expensive undertaking where the class is large-may defeat a class action. But this
problem arises infrequently because employment discrimination
class actions usually fall under a subsection of rule 23 that does not
require notice.50
Remedies
The EEOC has limited enforcement powers. It may not issue
orders or impose sanctions against employers who have violated
Title VII. However, the Commission may act as plaintiff in a Title
VII suit and is able to seek temporary injunctions in federal district
court. " Generally, to obtain a preliminary injunction the plaintiff
43. Cunningham v. Litton Indus., 413 F.2d 887 (9th Cir. 1969). It should be remembered,
however, that initiation of a Title VII suit does not toll the statute of limitations in a § 1981
action. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (1974).
44. 97 S.Ct. 441 (1976).
45. Id. at 446-47.
46. See note 33 supra.
47. FED. R. Civ. P. 23. The class must meet the requirements of numerosity, commonality,
typicality, and adequate representation. See Meyers, Title VII Class Actions: Promises and
Pitfalls, 8 Loy. CH. L.J. 767 (1977).
48. Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1968). Contra, Hyatt v. United
Aircraft Corp., 50 F.R.D. 242 (D. Conn. 1970).
49. Miller v. International Paper Co., 408 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1969).
50. Class actions based on charges of employment discrimination are generally brought
under rule 23(b)(2). That section, which involves pleas for injunctive relief, does not require
notice. Notice is merely discretionary on the part of the court. Rule 23(b)(3), which does
require notice, is the section used when the relief sought is primarily damages.
51. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(2) (Supp. IV 1974). The statute does not clearly state whether
private plaintiffs may also seek preliminary injunctions. See, e.g., Hochstadt v. Worcester
Foundation, 11 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1426 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 804
(1st Cir. 1976); Drew v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 480 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 8

must demonstrate both a high probability of success on the merits
and threat of irreparable injury if preliminary relief is not granted.
The existence of irreparable injury may sometimes be presumed
from a preliminary determination that Title VII has in fact been
3
violated.1
Title VII gives the courts broad power to fashion relief.-4 In the
typical case, both back pay and attorneys' fees are awarded to the
successful plaintiff. In Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,55 the Supreme Court held that back pay in Title VII cases should be denied
only for reasons that "if applied generally, would not frustrate
[Title VII's] central statutory purposes of eradicating discrimination . . . and making persons whole for injuries suffered through
past discrimination."" Thus, back pay is consistently awarded in
Title VII cases except in the rare instance where the employer is
complying in good faith with state "protective laws" or relying on
EEOC guidelines or rulings.
The Act provides that a court may allow the prevailing party
reasonable attorneys' fees. 8 While some courts have allowed the
successful defendant to receive attorneys' fees, the usual practice
is to allow such fees only to prevailing plaintiffs. The rationale is
that these awards are intended to encourage individuals to assert
their rights under Title VII as well as to penalize employers for
pursuing meritless defenses. 0 The burden is on the plaintiff to prove
417 U.S. 935 (1974). But see Jerome v. Viviano Food Co., 489 F.2d 965 (6th Cir. 1974). The
Supreme Court may consider this question in Berg v. Richmond Unified School Dist., 528
F.2d 1208 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 806 (1977). See Ashton, The Availability of
PreliminaryInjunctive Relief to Private Plaintiffs Pending Equal Employment Opportunity
CommissionA ction Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 8 Loy. Cm. L.J. 51 (1976).
52. See, e.g., Berg v. Richmond Unified School Dist., 528 F.2d 1208 (9th Cir. 1975), cert.
granted, 97 S. Ct. 806 (1977).
53. Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co., 421 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1970).
54. Section 706(g) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. IV 1974), provides, in pertinent part:
[T]he court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, aid order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may
include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without
back pay . . . or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.
55. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
56. Id. at 421. Back pay liability under the 1972 amendments is limited to two years prior
to the filing of the charge. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. IV 1974).
57. See Wernet v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butchermen, Local 17, 484 F.2d 403, 404
(6th Cir. 1973) (union protected where relied on state statute requiring employer to maintain
separate seniority lists for men and women); Kober v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 480 F.2d
240 (3d Cir. 1973) (no abuse of discretion in denial of back pay where employer relied on state
law limiting hours women may work).
58. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1970).
59. See, e.g., Van Hoomissen v. Xerox Corp., 503 F.2d 1131 (9th Cir. 1974).
60. Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 804 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S.
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that he is entitled to such an award. 6'
Affirmative relief may also be granted by the courts, and usually
takes the form of preferential treatment or quotas. This remedy is
considered appropriate when the employer's discriminatory action
consists of a practice affecting a large group of persons rather than
a single individual. Eradicating the effects of past discrimination
through affirmative action presents difficulties for the courts due to
62
the statutory prohibition on the use of preferential treatment.
3
Additionally, quotas may result in reverse discrimination charges.1
Many courts have nevertheless used percentage remedies for Title
VII violations." Examples of other types of affirmative relief include
retroactive seniority credit" and union merger to eliminate segregation .6

Using their powers liberally, some courts have even awarded punitive damages, although the circuits are divided on whether they
are ever appropriate in a Title VII action. In EEOC v. Detroit Edi1006 (1971). In Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir.
1974), the Fifth Circuit listed a number of factors that should be considered by a court in
determining the propriety and the size of such awards: (1) the time and labor required, (2)
the novelty and difficulty of the questions, (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service
properly, (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the
case, (5) the customary fee, (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent, (7) time limitations
imposed by the client or the circumstances, (8) the amount involved and the results obtained,
(9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys, (10) the "undesirability" of the
case, (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client, and (12)
awards in similar cases.
61. Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 720 (5th Cir. 1974).
62. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2() (1970). This prohibition has been interpreted to mean that
"while quotas merely to attain racial balance are forbidden, quotas to correct past discriminatory practices are not." United States v. Lathers, Local 46, 471 F.2d 408 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973).
63. The recent Supreme Court decision in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427
U.S. 273 (1976), holding that whites have standing to sue under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970), may
provide a new basis for charges of reverse discrimination. See Venick & Lane, Reverse Discrimination and Affirmative Action After McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail TransportationCo., 8
Loy. CHI. L.J. 789 (1977); Note, The Employer's Dilemma: Quotas, Reverse Discrimination
and Voluntary Compliance, 8 Loy. Cm. L.J. 369 (1977).
64. See, e.g., Kirkland v. Department of Correction Servs., 520 F.2d 420 (2d Cir. 1975);
Associated Gen. Contractors v. Altshuler, 490 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S.
957 (1974); United States v. Ironworkers, Local 86, 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 984 (1971). When quotas are used, the courts usually try to limit the scope as much as
possible, avoiding the imposition of an inflexible requirement so that the employer has some
leeway to select on a merit basis, making the time limitation a temporary one, or requiring a
goal rather than a permanent quota. See, e.g., Rios v. Steamfitters, Local 638, 501 F.2d 622
(2d Cir. 1974); Local 53, Int'l Ass'n of Heat Workers v. Volger, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969).
65. See, e.g., Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., Inc., 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
66. See, e.g., Evans v. Sheraton Park Hotel, 503 F.2d 177 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United States
v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 460 F.2d 497 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1007
(1972).
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son Co., 7 the Sixth Circuit denied such damages, holding that the
statute allows only equitable remedies. Money damages in the form
of back pay awards are generally considered the sole exception to
this limitation since they represent a form of equitable restitution.
Nevertheless, a few courts have allowed punitive damages as well
as other forms of compensation. 8
The FederalEmployee Under Title VII
The 1972 amendments to Title VII added a new section providing
that personnel actions affecting federal employees or applicants
"shall be made free from any discrimination based on race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin," generally giving these persons the
same protections as non-federal workers. 9 Previously, federal employees had no statutory recourse for employment discrimination.
At present, it is unclear which of the Act's defenses are available
to the federal government. The federal employee section incorporates the business necessity defense, but a defense based on a bona
fide seniority or merit system, ability testing, or a bfoq appears to
have no application to federal employment." The courts have not
yet addressed this apparent omission.
The federal employee's or applicant's procedural course and the
time period in which to challenge federal practices differ substantially from that of other Title VII complainants. He has only thirty
days to bring alleged discrimination to the attention of a designated
counselor. 7 If the employee is not satisfied with the counselor's
conciliation attempts, he has fifteen days to file a formal complaint.7" The complaint is heard by an "examiner, 7 3 following
which the agency head (or his designee) will rule on the merits of
the complaint.7 4 The complainant then has another fifteen days to
appeal to the Civil Service Commission.75 Following the Civil Service hearing, if the employee remains dissatisfied he may file a civil
67. 515 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1975).
68. Claiborne v. Illinois Cen. R.R., 401 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D. La. 1975) (punitive damages);
Humphrey v. Southwestern Portland Cement Co., 369 F. Supp. 832 (W.D. Tex. 1973) (damages for pain and suffering), rev'd on other grounds, 488 F.2d 691 (5th Cir. 1974).
69. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) (Supp. IV 1974).
70. Id. at § 2000e-16(d). Section 16(d) incorporates § 5(g) which includes the business
necessity defense. Not incorporated are §§ 2(e) and (h) which set forth the other defenses.
71. 5 C.F.R. § 713.214(a)(i) (1976).
72. Id. at § 713.214(a)(ii).
73. Id. at § 713.218(a).
74. Id. at § 713.221(a).
75. Id. at § 713.233(a). The time limit may be extended where the employee was not aware
of the limitation or where extenuating circumstances exist. Id. at § 713.233(b).
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action in federal court within thirty days.7" Once in federal court,
however, the action becomes indistinguishable from that of other
Title VII plaintiffs, with the same range of remedies available to the
federal employee.77
SECTION

1981

OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS

AcT

OF

1866

Section 1981 was enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. 7s
It provides that all persons shall have the same right to make and
enforce contracts as is enjoyed by white citizens. For more than a
century the Act was79applied only to discrimination occurring under
"color of state law." In 1968, the Supreme Court, in Jones v. Alfred
H. Mayer Co.,"0 expanded the scope of the Civil Rights Act of 1866
by holding that state action was not a prerequisite to suit.8
Coverage and Exemptions
Section 1981's protection of the right to contract includes privileges relating to employment. Unlike Title VII, there is no restriction concerning the minimum number of employees an employer
must have and no interstate commerce requirement. The section
prohibits discrimination based on race, and until recently the courts
were in conflict as to whether it affords a remedy to white as well
as black litigants.8 2 The Supreme Court in McDonald v. Santa Fe
Trail Transportation Co.83 settled this dispute by holding that the
Act was meant to proscribe discrimination against, or in favor of, a
member of any race. In contrast to Title VII, section 1981 prohibits
discrimination against aliens" but does not reach discrimination
based on sex, religion, or national origin.
76. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (Supp. IV 1974). See Chandler v. Roudebush, 96 S. Ct. 1949
(1976), where the Supreme Court held that a federal employee has the right to a trial de novo
following a Civil Service hearing.
77. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(b) (Supp. IV 1974).
78. Act of April 9, 1866, c. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, now codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970).
79. See, e.g., Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948); Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1
(1906). See generally discussion in Young v. International Tel. & Tel. Co., 438 F.2d 757, 75860 (3d. Cir. 1971).
80. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
81. Id. Although Jones applied to § 1982, in Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S.
454 (1975), the Court held that § 1981 also did not require state action.
82. Compare Ripp v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 205 (N.D. Ala. 1973); Perkins v.
Banster, 190 F. Supp. 98 (D. Md. 1960) with Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971);
Hollander v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 392 F. Supp. 90 (D. Conn. 1975).
83. 427 U.S. 273 (1976). See generally Shoenberger, A Prolegomenato Reviving the Civil
Rights Act of 1866: White Standing Under Section 1981-A Federal Common Law Right to
Contract, 8 Loy CHI. L.J. 81 (1976).
84. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 377 (1971). A number of courts have reached
the conclusion that § 1981 provides no remedy for sex discrimination. Waters v. Heublein
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Prohibitionsand Defenses
All facets of an employment situation or union membership are
considered contractual relationships within the meaning of section
1981.85 Consequently, when discrimination occurs in hiring, promotion, union membership, or some other employment benefit, the
affected individual has been denied the right to contract because of
his race or national origin and, therefore, has a cause of action under
this statute.
The section 1981 plaintiff must initially establish that he or members of his group receive different treatment than similarly situated
workers of another race or citizenship. In addition, the section 1981
plaintiff must demonstrate an intent of the employer to discriminate against him or members of his group. Since the Supreme Court
decision of Washington v. Davis, 7 plaintiffs may use Title VII standards to demonstrate the disparate impact of a test or practice.
However, establishing this Title VII prima facie case is not enough;
a section 1981 plaintiff must also demonstrate intent to discriminate. Prior to Washington v. Davis, business necessity was held to
be a defense to section 1981 as well as to Title VII.11 It is unclear
whether this and other Title VII defenses are now available in section 1981 actions.
Procedures and Time Limitations
Section 1981 procedures are considerably simpler than those
applicable to Title VII. There is no administrative machinery
attending a section 1981 action, and there are no time limitations
comparable to those of Title VII. s8 The individual must simply file
a complaint in the appropriate federal district court.
However, there is confusion as to which statute of limitations is
applicable in section 1981 actions. Congress failed to enact a statute
Inc., 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 908 (N.D. Cal. 1974); League of Academic Women v. Regents
of the Univ. of Cal., 343 F. Supp. 636 (N.D. Cal. 1972). The Supreme Court, in dictum,
apparently agrees: "[Petitioners] do not present any question of the right of a private school
to limit its student body to boys, to girls, or to adherents of a particular religious faith, since
42 U.S.C. § 1981 is in no way addressed to such categories of selectivity." Runyon v. McCrary,
427 U.S. 160, 167 (1976).
85. Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 427 F.2d 476 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 911
(1970).
86. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 246-48 (1976). See Comment, Employment Discrimination- Washington v. Davis: Splitting the Causes of Action Against Racial Discrimination in Employment, 8 Loy, Ci. L.J. 225 (1976).
87. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
88. Long v. Ford Motor Co., 496 F.2d 500, 506 (6th Cir. 1974).
89. See text accompanying notes 32-43 supra.
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of limitations applicable to the Civil Rights Act of 1866 forcing
federal courts to turn to the state statutes. In attempting to engraft
the appropriate state laws, federal courts use various state statutes
of limitations including contract statutes 1 and statutes governing
liabilities created by federal law.2 The time limitations specified by
these statutes can differ greatly. 3
Another procedural difficulty for section 1981 plaintiffs is the relationship between that section and Title VII. The initial question
is whether the section 1981 discriminatee must exhaust EEOC administrative procedures before bringing his section 1981 action. The
courts of appeals that considered the question agreed that exhaustion was not necessary. 4 And the Supreme Court, in Johnson v.
Railway Express Agency,9" stated that Congress did not expect that
a section 1981 action could be used only upon completion of EEOC
requirements. Thus, the section 1981 plaintiff need have no con-tact with the EEOC before initiating suit.
Because of this dual protection, complications arise when the
complainant decides to pursue both Title VII and section 1981 remedies. 7 The Johnson Court made clear that the initiation of a Title
VII complaint does not toll the statute of limitations on a section
1981 action. Therefore, the running of the statute of limitations
may force the plaintiff to file the section 1981 action before the
EEOC has completed its conciliation attempts. In turn, the filing
of the civil action may discourage any meaningful conciliation efforts. 9 The Court suggests that a plaintiff might ask a district court
90. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
91. Boudreaux v. Baton Rouge Marine Contracting Co., 437 F.2d 1011 (5th Cir. 1971).
92. Chambers v. Omaha Pub. School Dist., 536 F.2d 222 (8th Cir. 1976).
93. Limitations may range from one year under the new Tennessee statute applicable to
federal civil rights actions, TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-304 (Supp. 1976), to 10 years under the
Louisiana statute applicable to contract actions. LA. CtV. CODE ANN. art. 3544 (1953). See
Boudreaux v. Baton Rouge Marine Contracting Co., 437 F.2d 1011 (5th Cir. 1971). In Illinois
§ 1981 actions, the Seventh Circuit has applied the five-year statute of limitations for civil
actions not otherwise provided for. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83 § 16 (1975). Waters v. Wisconsin
Steel Works, 427 F.2d 476 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 911 (1970).
94. See, e.g., Taylor v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 524 F.2d 263 (10th Cir. 1975); Alpha Portland
Cement Co. v. Reese, 507 F.2d 607 (5th Cir. 1975); Long v. Ford Motor Co., 496 F.2d 500 (6th
Cir. 1974).
95. 421 U.S. 454 (1974).
96. Id. at 461.
97. See generally Larson, The Development of § 1981 as a Remedy for Racial Discrimination in Private Employment, 7 HARv. C.R.-C.L.L. REv. 56 (1972).
98. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (1974).
99. This contingency may also occur before the EEOC decides whether to bring its own
suit, a possibility which may appeal to the plaintiff for financial reasons.
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to stay the 1981 proceedings until the EEOC administrative efforts
terminate. 00 However, the effectiveness of this option is untested.
Remedies
Section 1981 remedies generally include those available under
Title VII,"°" and the courts usually rely on Title VII for guidance in
formulating relief in these cases. °0 The Supreme Court in Johnson'3
established that in section 1981 actions courts have broad discretion
to fashion remedies: "An individual who establishes a cause of action under 1981 is entitled to both equitable and legal relief, including compensatory and, under certain circumstances, punitive damages.' 04 In addition to providing compensation other than back pay,
courts may allow more frequent punitive damage awards in section
1981 suits-a remedy considered inappropriate under Title VII. 0
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT

The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)"'6 is an industrial relations statute protecting the right of workers to organize and providing for peaceful resolution of industrial disputes through collective
bargaining. 07 Though the statute was not intended to remedy problems in the area of employment discrimination, it has been applied
recently to protect the rights of minorities.' 8
Coverage and Exemptions
The NLRA created the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB),
an agency charged with administration and enforcement of the Act.
100. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 461 (1976). The Court recognized
that filing suit may deter conciliation efforts and that the failure of the suit could weaken
EEOC efforts.
101. 421 U.S. at 465.
102. See text accompanying notes 54-66 supra. Attorneys' fees were generally awarded in
§ 1981 suits, by analogy to Title VII, until Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Society,
421 U.S. 240 (1975), where, in a different context, the Supreme Court rejected the "private
attorney general" basis for attorneys' fees awards. In direct response to Alyeska, Congress
amended § 1988 to make attorneys' fees available in § 1981 suits. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 (1976
Supp.). This amendment effectively eliminates one of the distinctions between § 1981 and
Title VII.
103. See, e.g., Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1974). The
reason for this reliance is that § 1981 has no statutory description of the types of relief
available, and also because Title VII remedial case law was fairly well developed at the time
that § 1981 became available in private discrimination suits.
104. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 460 (1974).
105. See text accompanying notes 67-68 supra.
106. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1970 & Supp. IV 1974).
107. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970).
108. See Boyce, Racial Discriminationand the NationalLaborRelations Act, 65 Nw. U.L.
REV. 232 (1970).
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The statute applies to labor organizations, defined as organizations
of any kind in which employees participate that exist for the purpose of dealing with employers concerning grievances and labor disputes. 19 The Supreme Court has held that a labor organization need
not be a union and could include a loosely organized employee group
that discussed working conditions, wages, and grievances with management." 0 Non-union members also receive some protection under
the Act."' The major exception to coverage is for political subdivisions, including federal, state, and local governmental bodies." 2
Prohibitions and Defenses
The NLRA contains no express prohibitions against racially discriminatory employment practices. Nevertheless, the Act has been
applied by the courts to prohibit discrimination in three areas: (1)
the union's duty of fair representation, (2) "invidious" employer
practices, and (3) the certification process.
The NLRA contains no express duty of fair representation. However, in Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co.,"' the Supreme
Court held that a statutory right of exclusive representation carried
a concomitant duty to represent fairly all members of the employment unit, including non-union members." ' The scope of the
union's duty was delineated in Vaca v. Sipes,"' where the Supreme
Court held that a union breaches the duty of fair representation
"only when a union's conduct toward a member of the collective
bargaining unit is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith."", If
the union representative breaches this duty, the right of the employees to "bargain collectively" is impaired and a violation of the
NLRA results."7
109.

29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1970).

110.
111.
112.

NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co., 360 U.S. 203 (1959).
See text accompanying note 114 infra.
29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (Supp. IV 1974).

113. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).

114. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768 (1952). Both Steele and
Howard involved the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1970). This standard was
applied to the NLRA in Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953).
115. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).

116. Id. at 190. This standard was recently refined in Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc.,
424 U.S. 554 (1976).

117. Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the NLRA provides that an unfair labor practice results if the
union "restrain[s] or coerce[s] . .. employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in
section 157 .. " 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1970). Section 7 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157
(1970), provides, in pertinent part: "Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to
form, join, or assist labor organizations, . . . and to engage in other concerted activities for
the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection .. "
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Although the NLRA does not apply to union membership rules,"'
the duty of fair representation appears to prohibit membership policies based on racial or sexual factors." 9 However, an unfair labor
practice charge cannot be predicated solely on the fact that the
union's action prejudices certain employees. The complainant must
also demonstrate that the union acted in bad faith or in an arbitrary
manner.110
Basically, the Act provides that it is an unfair labor practice for
an employer to interfere with employees' organizational rights.',
Specifically, the employer may not encourage or discourage union
membership through his hiring practices or other terms or conditions of employment.' To demonstrate that the employer's discrimination is a violation of the NLRA, it must be shown that the
discrimination interferes with or restrains the employees from exercising their section 7 right to act concertedly.12s The District of Columbia Circuit has held that an employer's discrimination always
affects section 7 rights. The court maintained this dissimilar treatment creates a clash of interests between groups of employees which
causes apathy inhibiting workers from asserting their section 7
rights.'24 The NLRB has refused to accept this approach and examines the facts in each case to determine if the employer is actually
interfering with the employees' right to organize.12e
The certification process is another area in which employment
discrimination considerations may be relevant. The NLRB may revoke certification from a discriminating union, an effective sanction
since without certification the union cannot act as the employees'
representative. The Eighth Circuit, in NLRB v. Mansion House
Center Management Corp.,'28 held that the NLRB could not become
"a willing participant in the union's discriminatory practices" by
granting certificaton. 27 The NLRB in Bekins Moving & Storage
118. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1970) provides, in part: "[Tihis paragraph shall not
impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein ....
119. NLRB v. Local 106, Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n, 520 F.2d 693 (6th Cir. 1975). The
court held that ordering merger of two sex-segregated locals, arguably a violation of §
8(b)(1)(A), did not constitute an unauthorized interference in local union affairs. Id. at 697.
120. See, e.g., Bleier v. NLRB, 457 F.2d 871, 872 (3d Cir. 1972).
121. 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(a)(1) (1970).
122. Id. at § 158(a)(3).
123. United Packinghouse v. NLRB, 416 F.2d 1126 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 903
(1969).
124. Id. at 1135.
125. Jubilee Mfg. Co., 202 N.L.R.B. 272 (1973).
126. 473 F.2d 471 (8th Cir. 1973).
127. Id. at 473.
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Co.,"'2 adopted the Eighth Circuit's holding but soon narrowed its
position to exclude sex discrimination 9 and, this spring, overruled
Bekins.' 30 Union discrimination may still be challenged in a postcertification unfair labor practice proceeding.
Procedures and Time Limitations
The NLRA provides that a person aggrieved under the Act may
file a charge with the NLRB. The Act establishes a six month statute of limitations for filing unfair labor practice charges.13'
Where the collective bargaining contract contains an applicable
anti-discrimination clause, the grievant must exhaust internal
grievance procedures before resort to the NLRB or the courts. 132 The
union controls access to the grievance machinery 33 and has discretion to refuse to act on behalf of an aggrieved employee if the decision is made in good faith. 14 However, if the union's refusal to act
is discriminatory, the duty of fair representation has been breached
and the individual is free to file a charge against the union with the
NLRB, or to sue the union and employer directly in federal court.
Where the charge alleges employer discrimination affecting only the
right to organize, the employee must use the grievance procedure
and then may file an unfair labor practice charge with the NLRB.
Charges are filed with a regional office of the NLRB General
Counsel.'1 If a charge appears to have merit, a complaint will be
issued against the offending party and the case will be tried by the
General Counsel staff before an administrative law judge. From that
decision there is a right of appeal to the five-member Board, and
final decisions are subject to review and enforcement in the courts
of appeals.' 3 Final appealable orders do not include the General

Counsel's refusal to issue a complaint 13 and are thus limited to the
128. 211 N.L.R.B. 138 (1974).
129. Bell & Howell Co., 213 N.L.R.B. 407 (1974). In this case Member Kennedy joined
the Bekins dissenters to form a new majority on the ground that sex had been found not to
be a "suspect" classification by the Supreme Court.
130. Handy Andy, Inc., 94 L.R.R.M. 1354 (1977).
131. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1970).
132. Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965).
133. Black-Clawson Co., Inc. v. International Ass'n of Machinists Lodge 355, 313 F.2d 179
(2d Cir. 1962).
134. Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 568-71 (1976); Vaca v. Sipes, 386
U.S. 171, 191-92 (1967).
135. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1970).
136. Appeals may be made to the District of Columbia Circuit or to the circuit where the
offense occurred. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e), (f) (1970).
137. United Electrical Contractors Ass'n v. Ordman, 366 F.2d 776 (2d Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 1026 (1967).
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Board's actual decisions.
Because duty of fair representation claims often involve charges
that are "not normally within the Board's unfair labor practice
jurisdiction,"' 3 8 a Title VII suit may be preferable to filing a charge
with the Board.'39 A Title VII claim provides direct access to the
employer, thereby circumventing the union representatives or arbitrators who may be susceptible to the influence of the allegedly
discriminating employer. Title VII also offers the advantages of
choice of attorney, the possibility of attorneys' fees awards, and the
availability of class action suits.
Remedies
The remedies available to the complainant in this area fall into
three categories: (1) those specified in the collective bargaining
agreement, (2) those set out in the NLRA, and (3) those available
through the courts.
Resort to the collective bargaining agreement's internal
grievance-arbitration procedures may produce a satisfactory result.
Although the scope of available remedies is limited to those specified in the collective bargaining agreement, the arbitration process
is usually faster and less costly than court action. In addition, it is
clear that the aggrieved employee does not forfeit his Title VII rights
by resort to the grievance procedure.' 0
The NLRA sets out the forms of relief available through the
NLRB. The Act provides that the Board may issue cease and desist
orders and may "take such affirmative action including reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the
policies of [the Act]."' 4 ' The Board is authorized to petition the
courts of appeals for the enforcement of its orders.' Its regional
directors may petition federal district courts for temporary injunctions, "1 available upon a showing that an injunction is necessary to
prevent, frustration of the NLRA's purposes.'"
138. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 181 (1967).
139. On the other hand, internal grievance procedures and filing a charge with the Board
carry other advantages, particularly the absence of cost to the grievant. See Boyce, Racial
Discriminationand the National Labor Relations Act, 65 Nw. U.L. REv. 232, 236 (1970).
140. See Note, The False Hope of a Footnote: Arbitration of Title VII Disputes After
Alexander v. Gardner-DenverCo., 8 Loy. CH. L.J. 847 (1977).
141. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1970).
142. Id. at § 160(e).
143. Id. at § 160(6).
144. See, e.g., Boire v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 515 F.2d 1185 (5th Cir. 1975); Boire v.
International Bhd. of Teamsters, 479 F.2d 778 (5th Cir. 1973); UAW v. NLRB, 449 F.2d 1046
(D.C. Cir. 1971).
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The most common Board remedy is the cease and desist order,
although affirmative action may also be required.4 5 Remedies for
employer discrimination vary considerably. Reinstatement is the
usual remedy for discriminatory discharges, 4 ' with back pay generally available for both employer and union discrimination. 47 In
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,' the Supreme Court emphasized
that back pay is available under the NLRA even where the unfair
labor practice was perpetuated in good faith. The courts, in enforcement actions, generally employ the same remedies.'
1963
The Equal Pay Act of 1963 (the Act) 50 is an amendment to the
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.'11 The purpose of the Act is to
eliminate wage differentials based on sex by requiring employers to
pay equal wages for equal work.'52 Although the Act is primarily
intended to apply to women, it is not sex-restricted and male victims of discrimination have been allowed to recover. 153
THE EQUAL PAY ACT OF

Coverage and Exemptions
The Equal Pay Act's coverage is complex. The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) sets out the statutory definitions, procedures, and
remedies that are also applicable to the Act. Like Title VII, the Act
requires an effect on interstate commerce,' 5 but it does not require
that the employer have a minimum number of employees.
The Act's coverage is delineated according to the type of enterprise. Some businesses need only meet the commerce requirement,
while others must meet an additional prerequisite of minimum annual sales.'55 Some businesses, such as small retail or service establishments, may be totally exempted from the Act. 5 1 While an em145. See, e.g., H.W. Elson Bottling Co., 155 N.L.R.B. 714 (1965), modified, 379 F.2d 223
(6th Cir. 1967).
146. See, e.g., Armstrong Rubber Co. v. NLRB, 511 F.2d 741 (5th Cir. 1975). The same
remedies are available in breach of duty of fair representation cases. See generally Miranda
Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962).
147. Local 2088, IBEW, 218 N.L.R.B. 396 (1975).
148. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
149. See, e.g., NLRB v. Madison Courier, Inc., 472 F.2d 1307 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
150. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1970).
151. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1970 & Supp. IV 1974).
152. Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195 (1974).
153. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Dawes, 522 F.2d 380 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424
U.S. 914 (1976); Hodgson v. Pet, Inc., 21 Wage and Hour Cas. 958 (W.D. Pa. 1974).
154. 29 U.S.C. § 203(b) (1970).
155. 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1)-(4) (Supp. IV 1974).
156. Id. at § 203(s)(1). A full discussion of the Equal Pay Act's coverage and exemptions
is beyond the scope of this article. For a comprehensive discussion of this subject see Gitt &
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ployer may come within one of the FLSA exemptions, his employee
may still have an equal pay remedy under a state equal pay statute'57 or an applicable state fair employment practices statute. 58 In
addition, Title VII also precludes wage discrimination. 51
The 1974 amendments extended the FLSA and the Act's coverage
to local, state, and federal agencies.' In National League of Cities
v. Usery"'' the Court held the amendments unconstitutional insofar
as they extended the Act's minimum wage and maximum hour
provisions to state and local governments. However, the Court did
not address the issue of whether the equal pay provisions were
applicable to such entities. It has subsequently been held that the
equal pay provisions are applicable to state and local governments.'
ProhibitedActs and Defenses
The Act prohibits sex discrimination based on unequal pay for
equal work. Equal work means substantially equal rather than
identical,' and is statutorily defined as "jobs the performance of
which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are
performed under similar working conditions."'6 4 The statute also
provides that a discriminating employer must raise the wage rate
of the lesser-paid employee.' This duty is not circumvented by the
transfer or discharge of one employee.'
The Act provides the employer with affirmative defenses for unequal wages based on (1) a seniority system, (2) a merit system, (3)
a system that measures earnings by quantity or quality of producGelb, Beyond the Equal Pay Act: Expanding Wage Differential Protections Under Title VII,
8 Loy. CHI. L.J. 723 (1977); Note, The Scope of Coverage Under the Fair Labor Standards
Act of 1938, 30 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 149 (1973).
157. Some states' equal pay statutes are considerably more limited in scope than the
Equal Pay Act. Illinois' statute, for example, covers only employers of six or more persons
and protects only "persons engaged in the manufacturing of any article." It has a six-month
statute of limitatons. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 48 § 4(b) (1975).
158. For example, the Illinois Fair Employment Practices Act, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 48 §§
851-867 (1975), requires a minimum of 15 employees but applies to a broader range of enterprises than the Illinois Equal Pay Act.
159. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1970).
160. 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(2) (Supp. IV 1974).
161. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
162. Usery v. Allegheny County Hosp. Dist., 544 F.2d 148 (3d Cir. 1976); Christensen v.
State of Iowa, 417 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Iowa 1976); Usery v. Bettendorf Community School
Dist., 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 634 (S.D. Iowa 1976).
163. Schultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259, 265 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905
(1970).
164. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1970).
165. Id. at 206(d)(1).
166. Murphy v. Miller Brewing Co., 307 F. Supp. 829, 837 (E.D. Wis. 1969).
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tion, or (4) a differential based on any factor other than sex. 6 7
Additionally, the Portal-to-Portal Act of 194718 provides defenses
to the Fair Labor Standards Act. An employer's good faith reliance
on administrative regulations, orders, rulings, approvals, or interpretations is an absolute defense to liability under the FLSA. 16'
Moreover, a partial defense is allowed where the employer demonstrates that he acted in good faith and had reasonable grounds for
believing that he was not in violation of the FLSA.170 The employer
may not rely upon this defense where his industry generally has
been breaking the law without complaints. 1 '
Proceduresand Time Limitations
The Act adopts the procedural requirements of the Fair Labor
Standards Act. The individual may bring suit directly against the
employer without resort to an administrative process (unlike Title
VII). The FLSA allows class actions, providing each plaintiff consents to suit in writing.171 While the equal pay class action plaintiff
does not need to demonstrate that his class meets all the rule 2317
class action prerequisites, 74 the Equal Pay Act is more restrictive
than rule 23 in that it requires all parties to "opt in" while some rule
23 actions include all class members except those who have opted
5

out.17

The FLSA authorizes the Secretary of Labor to initiate three
types of proceedings. The first seeks injunctive relief and occurs
when a routine Department investigation produces a suspected violation.

176

The Secretary may also bring suit at an employee's request and

may recover liquidated damages in addition to back wages.177 Fi167. Case law on Equal Pay Act defenses has focused on the "factor other than sex." The
defendant is generally not successful. See, e.g., Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S.
188 (1974); Hodgson v. Behrens Drug Co., 475 F.2d 1041 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
822 (1973). However, in Hodgson v. Robert Hall Clothes, Inc., 473 F.2d 589 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 866 (1973), the defendant successfully argued that his wage discrimination
was justified because the salesmen generated more profits than the saleswomen.
168. 29 U.S.C. §§ 251-262 (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 251-62 (Supp. IV 1974).
169. 29 U.S.C. § 259(a) (1970).
170. 29 U.S.C. § 260 (Supp. IV 1974). See, e.g., Hodgson v. Square D Co., 459 F.2d 805
(6th Cir. 1972); United States v. Stocks Lincoln-Mercury, 307 F.2d 266 (10th Cir. 1962).
171. See, e.g., Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1068, 1094 (D.C.
Cir. 1976).
172. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (Supp. IV 1974).
173. FED. R. Ctv. P. 23.
174. See note 47 supra.
175. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (Supp. IV 1974) with FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(3).
176. 29 U.S.C. § 217 (1970).
177. 29 U.S.C. § 216(c) (Supp. IV 1974).
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nally, the Secretary, with the employee's consent, may supervise the
payment of wages due where the employer agrees to such an ar78
rangement prior to suit.'
The statute of limitations for equal pay actions is generally two
years; however, in the case of a willful violation the limitation is
extended to three years.' Thus, a wage discrimination suit may
remain viable under the Act even though time-barred by Title VII's
shorter limitation periods.
Remedies
Recovery of back wages is the remedy in all successful Equal Pay
Act suits. 80 Additionally, in suits brought by an individual, or by
the Secretary on behalf of an individual, liquidated damages equal
to the amount of wages withheld may be recovered.' 8' Attorneys' fees
and court costs are granted only where an individual, and not the
Secretary, is the named plaintiff. 8 2 Liquidated damages are not
recoverable by individuals who consent to the Secretary's supervision of back pay awards prior to suit or where the Secretary initiates
a suit for injunctive relief.183
The Act contains special provisions concerning willful violations.
Plaintiffs have three years rather than two to file suit, and criminal
actions based on these violations may be brought by the Justice
Department'84 (though it appears that this authority has not been
exercised). The courts have had difficulty defining the term "willful
violation" since the Act provides no guidance. One view is that
"willful" requires only knowledge of the possible applicability of
the Act. 85 Other courts maintain that "violations of the Act must
be deliberate, voluntary and intentional."'" An intermediate inter178. Id.
179. 29 U.S.C. § 255 (1970). Not yet finally settled is the effect on a subsequent Equal
Pay Act suit of an individual's resort to the EEOC or internal grievance procedures. See
Stansell v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 404 F. Supp. 696, 701 (N.D. Ga. 1975) (filing with EEOC
does not toll Equal Pay Act statute of limitations); Satterwhite v. United Parcel Service, Inc.,
496 F.2d 448 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1079 (1974) (prior submission of claim to final
arbitration forecloses possibility of Equal Pay Act suit).
180. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (Supp. IV 1974).
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. 29 U.S.C. 99 216(c), 217 (1970 & Supp. IV 1974).
184. 29 U.S.C. § 216(a) (1970). The Act's criminal penalties provide for a maximum fine
of $10,000 and a prison term not to exceed six months, which may not be imposed on a first
offender.
185. Brennan v. Heard, 491 F.2d 1, 3 (5th Cir. 1974); Coleman v. Jiffy June Farms, Inc.,
458 F.2d 1139, 1141-42 (5th Cir. 1972).
186. Brennan v. Westinghouse Credit Corp., 21 Wage and Hour Cas. 871,876 (E.D. Tenn.
1973).
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pretation is that an employer commits a willful violation when he
"is cognizant of an appreciable possibility that he may be subject
fails to take steps reasonably
to the statutory requirements and
' 87
calculated to resolve the doubt.'
The Equal Pay Act's remedies would probably make this statute
more attractive than Title VII to the wage discrimination plaintiff,
due to the availability of liquidated damages in some equal pay
suits, the longer statute of limitations, and lack of administrative
prerequisites to suit. Plaintiffs would have no success circumventing
the Act's defenses through a Title VII action since Title VII provides
that a pay differential authorized by the Equal Pay Act is not unlawful under Title VII.18
1967
(ADEA) 81
1967
of
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act
represents a recent congressional effort to remedy unemployment
among older workers by prohibiting arbitrary age discrimination in
employment.190
THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT OF

Coverage and Exemptions
9
The ADEA protects only workers between forty and sixty-five. '
Like Title VII and the Equal Pay Act, the ADEA requires that the
employer be engaged in an industry affecting interstate comin 1974 to provide coverage for state
merce. 9 1 The Act was amended
1 3
and federal employees.
Prohibitionsand Defenses
The ADEA makes it illegal for an employer to refuse to hire, to
fire, or to otherwise discriminate with respect to terms or conditions
of employment because of an individual's age. 9 4 Like the Equal Pay
Act, the ADEA prohibits reduction of any employee's wages in attempting to comply with this Act." 5
The statute provides the defendant with an affirmative defense
187. Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1068, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
Courts discuss "willful" in the context of the statute of limitations, and it is not clear that
these interpretations would be used in deciding if criminal prosecution were appropriate.
188. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970).
189. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1970 & Supp. IV 1974).
190. 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1970).
191. 29 U.S.C. § 631 (Supp. IV 1974). The limit was raised from 60 to 65 in 1974.
192. Id. at § 630(b). The employer must also have a minimum of 20 employees.
193. Id. at 88 630(b), 633a.
194. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1970).
195. Id. at § 623(a)(3).
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where (1) age is a bona fide occupational qualification "reasonably
necessary" to the business or the differentiation is based on a factor
other than age; (2) the discrimination is mandated by a "bona fide
employee benefit plan . . . which is not a subterfuge"; or (3) "good
cause" for discharging or disciplining an employee exists. 96
The bona fide occupational qualification defense (bfoq),117 has
been used exclusively in cases where the defendant argues that
"public safety" justifies the age discrimination. For example, the
courts have upheld maximum cut-off ages for bus driver applicants,
holding that age was a valid bfoq defense due to safety considerations.19 8 In these cases the defendant only had to demonstrate that
elimination of the maximum hiring age would result in a slight
increase in risk to the public.' 9 However, it has recently been held
that the bfoq defense was not applicable to mandatory retirement
00
at age sixty-two for firemen.
A conflict exists as to the proper interpretation of the bona fide
employee benefit plan defense.20' The Fifth Circuit has held that a
pre-Act retirement plan, which \provided for mandatory retirement
at sixty, was protected. 2 The ADEA provides that a benefit plan
cannot be "bona fide" if it is "a subterfuge to evade the purposes"
of the ADEA. 20 The Fifth Circuit held that since the plan went into
effect before the enactment of the ADEA, it could not be a subterfuge. 0 The court also held that since the statutory language was
unambiguous it would not consider the argument that Congress'
intent was to exempt only those programs that would become too
196. Id. at § 623(f). For discussions of the "good cause" defense, see Surrisi v. Conwed
Corp., 510 F.2d 1088 (8th Cir. 1975); Brennan v. Reynolds & Co., 367 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. 11.
1973); Stringfellow v. Monsanto Co., 320 F. Supp. 1175 (W.D. Ark. 1970). See Note, Age
Discriminationin Employment: The Scope of Statutory Exceptions to the Age Discrimation
in Employment Act of 1967, 8 Loy. CHI. L.J. 864 (1977).
197. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1970).
198. Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976); Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied sub noam. Brennan v. Greyhound
Lines, Inc., 419 U.S. 1122 (1975).
199. Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 499 F.2d 859, 863 (7th Cir. 1974). Courts reject
the Title VII standard that would require demonstration that all or substantially all applicants over 40 could not perform safely. See Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d
228, 235 (5th Cir. 1969).
200. Aaron v. Davis, 414 F. Supp. 453 (E.D. Ark. 1976). The court distinguished
Greyhound on the basis of different types of risks.
201. 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(2) (1970).
202. Brennan v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 500 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1974).
203. 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(2) (1970).
204. Brennan v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 500 F.2d 212, 215 (5th Cir. 1974). The Second
Circuit agreed with this conclusion in Loraine v. Meba Pension Trust, 499 F.2d 49, 50 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1009 (1974). But see Dunlop v. Hawaiian Tel. Co., 12 Empl. Prac.
Dec. 5072 (D. Hawaii 1976).
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costly were the employer forced to provide full coverage for newly205
hired older workers.
The Fourth Circuit recently treated a pre-Act retirement plan
differently. 20 6 The court found the legislative history and policy considerations relevant and concluded that the statute forbids not only
subterfuge to evade the Act (which obviously could not have occurred before the Act existed), but subterfuge to evade the purposes
27
of the Act.
Proceduresand Time Limitations
The ADEA, like the Equal Pay Act, incorporates with some modifications the civil enforcement provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act. 20 8 There is no administrative procedure attendant to the
ADEA. Suits may be initiated by the complainant or by the Secretary of Labor.20 9 However, the ADEA requires that an individual
give the Secretary of Labor sixty days notice of intent to file a
complaint. 210 This notice must be filed within 180 days of the alleged
unlawful practice . 2 Where a state has designated an agency to
handle age discrimination claims, and that agency possesses adequate enforcement powers, notice must be filed there before filing
with the Secretary of Labor. 212 The Secretary must then be given
205. Brennan v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 500 F.2d 212, 217 (5th Cir. 1974). See also Zinger
v. Blanchette, 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 497 (3d Cir. 1977).
206. McMann v. United Air Lines, Inc., 542 F.2d 217 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. granted,97 S.
Ct. 1098 (1977).
207. Id. at 220.
208. 29 U.S.C. §§ 216, 217 (1970 & Supp. IV 1974).
209. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b), (c) (1970).
210. Id. at § 626(d).
211. Id. The courts interpret the 180-day notice period requirement liberally. No extension of the limit is allowed where the delay is due solely to plaintiff's actions, while the
requirement may be waived where the defendant or the Department of Labor is responsible
for the delay. See generally Hays v. Republic Steel Corp., 531 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir. 1976);
Woodburn v. LTV Aerospace Corp., 531 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1976); Ott v. Midland-Ross Corp.,
523 F.2d 1367 (6th Cir. 1975).
212. The Act specifies that a "deferral" agency exists where "a State . . . has a law
prohibiting discrimination in employment because of age and establishing or authorizing a
State authority to grant or seek relief ..
" 29 U.S.C. § 633(b) (1970). Some courts have
held that states that do not have adequate enforcement mechanisms do not have proper
deferral agencies. See, e.g., Lugo Garces v. Sagner Int'l, Inc., 534 F.2d 987 (1st Cir. 1976);
Eklund v. Lubrizol Corp., 529 F.2d 247 (6th Cir. 1976); Bertrand v. Orkin Exterminating Co.,
13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1447 (N.D. Ill. 1976). The plaintiff may be faced with a dilemma
where it is not clear whether his state will be considered a proper "deferral" state. A few
courts have held that resort to a proper state deferral agency is not a prerequisite to suit in
federal court. See Vazquez v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 405 F. Supp. 1353 (D.P.R. 1975);
Skoglund v. Singer Co., 403 F. Supp. 797 (D.N.H. 1975). But see Fitzgerald v. New England
Tel. & Tel. Co., 416 F. Supp. 617 (D. Mass. 1976).
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notice within 300 days of the allegedly discriminatory action.'"
State law determines how long the individual has to file with the
state agency. The individual may wait as long as two years to file
suit after the initial state/federal notice requirements are met.' "
Once the state agency receives the complaint it has sixty days of
exclusive jurisdiction in which to conciliate."1 5 When a complaint is
filed with the Secretary of Labor, either initially or upon exhaustion
of state procedure, the Secretary also has sixty days to conciliate.
1 ' As
The ADEA adopts the FLSA provision for class action suits."
with class actions under the Equal Pay Act, no person may be a
party plaintiff without filing a written consent. Most courts require
all class members, rather than just the class representatives, to
2 7
file. 1
Remedies
The ADEA adopts the FLSA remedy provisions with some modifications. The statute authorizes both legal and equitable relief,
including "compelling employment, reinstatement or promotion, or
enforcing the liability for amounts deemed to be unpaid . .
wages .... ,,211
Attorneys' fees and costs are allowed. 219 It is unsettled whether punitive or compensatory damages may be awarded.22
Unlike Equal Pay Act remedies, the ADEA limits liquidated damages to cases of willful violations. 2 There is no provision for criminal sanctions.
213. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (1970). If the state agency terminates its proceedings before the
300 days within which notice must be filed with the Secretary have elapsed, the individual
has either 30 days or the balance of the 300 days (whichever is less) in which to file notice of
intent with the Secretary.
214. Id. at § 626(e). The statute of limitations is three years in the case of a willful
violation. See text accompanying note 179 supra.
215. 29 U.S.C. § 633(b) (1970).
216. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (Supp. IV 1974) is incorporated into the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 626(b)
(1970).
217. See, e.g., La Chapelle v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 513 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1975); Sims v.
Parke Davis & Co., 453 F.2d 1259 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 978 (1972). But see
Blankenship v. Ralston Purina Co., 62 F.R.D. 35 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
218. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1970).
219. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (Supp. IV 1974).
220. Damages were allowed in Murphy v. American Motors Sales Corp., 410 F. Supp. 1403
(N.D. Ga. 1976) (punitive) and Bertrand v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 13 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. 1447 (N.D. Ill.
1976) (compensatory). But see Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng. Co., 14
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 518 (3d Cir. 1977) (denial of punitive damages) and Sant v. Mack
Trucks, Inc., 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 854 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (denial of compensatory damages).
221. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1970). See text accompanying notes 184-187 supra, concerning
different interpretations of "willful."
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CONCLUSION

The proliferation of employment discrimination suits in recent
years has been caused by the increase in fair employment related
statutes, as well as the availability of attorneys' fees, coupled with
an increased awareness by employees of their rights. Attorneys engaged in these suits will be faced with complex decisions concerning
the applicability of particular laws and an evaluation of differing
remedies. Factors confronting employment discrimination litigants
include: the parties to be named as defendants (e.g., employer,
union, employment agency); whether the client is a union member
or a member of a recognized bargaining unit; whether the applicable
collective bargaining contract exists; whether the statute of limitations or EEOC administrative time requirements bar relief under
certain statutes; the differences in relief available; and finally, the
merit of possible statutory defenses.
In a significant number of suits, there may be no choice of forum.
For example, the NLRA is available only to persons employed in a
bargaining unit; the Age Discrimination Act is limited to individuals between the ages of forty and sixty-five; section 1981 is available
only to those discriminated against because of race or alienage; and
the Equal Pay Act applies only to unequal wage treatment based
on sex. Title VII's cumbersome time limitations may often foreclose
that relief.
The major area of multiple statutory protections will probably
occur in instances of racial discrimination. In these cases the attorney must weigh the relative advantages and disadvantages of Title
VII, section 1981, and perhaps NLRA actions. The pertinent facts
and financial resources of the client also become significant in deciding when to resort to internal grievance machinery, to file a
charge with the NLRB, or to use the EEOC's administrative procedure. If significant compensatory or punitive damages are possible,
initial resort to the courts under section 1981 may be preferable.
Regardless of these individual decisions, successful employment
discrimination actions will become more frequent only when attorneys become more familiar with the possible avenues to pursue and
relative attractiveness of the alternatives.
KATRINA VEERHUSEN

